制造企业业务外包的关系契约激励模型  

A Relational Contract Incentive Model for Manufacturing Outsourcing

作　　者：和征[1] 王进富[1] 李勃[1] 杨小红[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安工程大学管理学院,陕西西安710048

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2018年第1期41-45,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272117);2016年陕西省社科基金项目(2016D016);2017年度陕西省软科学研究计划项目(2017KRM040);2017年度陕西省社科界重大理论与现实问题研究项目(2017Z005)

摘　　要：在制造企业的业务外包过程中,制造企业作为发包方,与承包商建立了良好的合作关系。为了维护制造企业和承包商合作关系的稳定性和长期性,考虑制造企业和承包商收益的贴现因子、承包商的声誉和能力、双方企业间的信任程度等因素,运用重复博弈理论,建立了关系契约激励模型,并对模型进行了求解和数值仿真。最后,得出了相应的研究结论。研究表明:承包商的声誉系数、能力系数、双方企业间的信任程度系数与双方企业收益的贴现因子正相关,承包商的努力成本系数与双方企业收益的贴现因子负相关;制造企业和承包商之间的对称性关系契约与承包商绩效的波动幅度有关。In the outsourcing process of manufacturing enterprise, as the employer, the manufacturing enterprise has establishedgood cooperative relationship with contractor. In order to maintain the stable and long-teron relationship between manufacturing enterp-rise and contractor, the discount factor of manufacturing enterprise and contractor, contractor＇s reputation and capability, the degree oftrust between two enterprises were considered, the relational contract incentive model was established by repeated game theor^^, and themodel was solved and simulated. Finally, the corresponding study conclusions were put for^-ard. The study shows contractor＇s reputationcoefficient, capability coefficient, the degree of trust between two enterprises are positively related to the discount factors of manufactu-ring enterprise and contractor, and contractor＇s effort cost coefficient is negatively related to the discount factors of manufacturing enter-prise and contractor. The symmetric relational contract between manufacturing enterprise and contractor is related to the fluctuation degreeof contractor＇s performance.

关 键 词：业务外包 制造业创新 激励机制 绩效经济 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]