股权激励、控股股东性质与信贷契约选择  

Managerial Equity Incentives, Controlling Shareholder Characteristics and the Choice of Credit Contracts

作　　者：杨慧辉[1] 汪建新[2] 郑月 

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学会计学院,上海201620 [2]上海对外经贸大学国际经贸学院,上海201620

出　　处：《财经研究》2018年第1期75-86,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2015BGL004);上海市软科学研究重点项目(16692106200)

摘　　要：我国公司股权相对集中,股权激励方案的设计和实施容易受到控股股东的影响。鉴于此,文章基于股权激励的行为引导效应和信号传递效应,以2009-2015年推行股权激励的上市公司为研究对象,剖析了在不同性质控股股东的调节作用下,股权激励的实施对信贷契约选择的不同影响。基于倾向得分匹配法和双重差分模型的分析结果表明:第一,国有控股公司的股权激励容易诱发管理层对信贷资金(特别是长期信贷资金)的偏好,而政府干预所形成的预算软约束使银行只能通过提高利率进行自我保护。第二,非国有控股股东对股权激励效应的调节作用与其现金流权和控制权分离情况密切相关。当两权匹配时,股权激励能够缓解管理层代理问题,此时银行预期债务企业的内部治理水平提升,从而公司可获得宽松的信贷契约;而当两权分离时,股权激励容易产生合谋效应,此时银行预期债务企业的内部治理水平降低,进而提出更加严苛的信贷契约条件。文章拓展了股权激励治理效应的研究,而且对于完善公司治理机制、有效实施股权激励计划具有重要参考价值。In the relatively concentrated ownership structure, the design and implementation of mana- gerial equity incentive plan are easily affected by controlling shareholders. The difference in the governance effect of controlling shareholders will have different effects on corporate financing demand and capability un- der the managerial equity incentives. The current research on equity incentives and corporate credit contractselection revolves around management agent issues, but pays little attention to the difference in the gov- ernance effect of controlling shareholders. Based on the signal transmission effect, the controlling sharehold- ers influence the credit decisions of the banks as the credit suppliers, thus affecting corporate credit financing ability under the equity incentives. Therefore, this paper incorporates the controlling shareholders, executives and banks into the same analytical framework, to study the implementation of equity incentives on the choice of credit contracts based on the regulatory role of the controlling shareholders. Using the sample composed of listed corporations implementing the managerial equity incentives from 2009 to 2015, we empirically examine the effect of the game among controlling shareholders, executives, and banks under different managerial equity incentives on the choice of credit contracts based on behavior guide and signaling effects of managerial equity incentives under the moderation role of three types of controlling shareholders, namely state-owned con- trolling shareholders, non-state-owned controlling shareholders with the separation of cash flow right and con- trol right, and non-state-owned controlling shareholders with the matching of cash flow right and control right. Using PSM method ＆ DID model and after controlling endogenous influences of scale, maturity and costs as three major elements of credit contracts and other factors influencing the choice of credit contract factors, we get the empirical conclusions. Firstly, equity incentives in the state-owned

关 键 词：股权激励 所有权结构 终极控股股东 现金流权—控制权 信贷契约 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]