地方政府与投融资平台：基于政府担保和激励视角的委托-代理模型  

Local Governments and Investment-Financing Platforms in China:A Principal-Agent Model based on Government Guarantee and Incentives Perspective

作　　者：陈其安[1] 陈抒妤 沈猛 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2018年第1期72-82,92,共12页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：重庆市社会科学规划重点项目(2016ZDGL12);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004);重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYS17029)

摘　　要：在对地方政府与投融资平台之间的关系进行全面考察的基础上,基于政府担保和激励视角构建地方政府与投融资平台之间的委托-代理模型。研究结果表明,地方政府对投融资平台的最优激励力度、投融资平台高管人员付出的最优努力水平以及地方政府获得的预期效用水平与投融资平台项目投资规模、投融资平台高管人员的能力水平以及地方政府从投融资平台项目投资产出中获得的隐性额外收益正相关;与投融资平台项目投资周期和外部经营环境风险负相关。从理论上解释了我国地方政府投融资平台资产规模和银行贷款债务不断增加、省级政府投融资平台治理效率优于市县级政府投融资平台、地方政府参与投融资平台公司治理的力度普遍不大、投融资平台高管人员付出的努力水平普遍不高,以及投融资平台公司治理水平普遍较低的原因;以现有省级政府投融资平台为基础整合市县级政府投融资平台、完善投融资平台高管人员市场选择机制、实施地方政府官员任期内的决策责任终身负责制、强化投融资平台的独立法人人格和市场经济主体地位,以及完善地方政府官员考核评价晋升激励机制是优化地方政府与投融资平台公司委托-代理关系的重要途径。On the basis of comprehensively investigating relationships between local governments and Investment-Financing Platforms （IFPs） in China, this paper develops a principal-agent model of China＇s local governments and associated IFPs based on the government guarantee and incentives perspectives. The results show that three factors of the optimal incentives of local governments on IFP ~ executives, the optimal effort of IFP~ executives and the expected utility of local governments are positively related to the project investment amounts of IFPs, the ability of IFP^s executives and local governments~ implicit-extra income obtained from the project output, meanwhile these factors are negatively related to the project investment payback period and the externally operating environment risk of IFPs, respectively. This paper explains the phenomena that, the asset size and the bank＇s loan debt of IFPs are ever-increasing, and thegovernance efficiency of the provincial IFP is better than that of the city or county IFP, and the corporate governance of local government participating in IFP is relatively weak, and the effort of IFP＇s executives is not significant and the corporate governance level of IFP is low theoretically. This study puts forward policy suggestions to optimize principal-agent relationships between China＇s local governments and their IFPs： （a） integrating the city and county IFPs on the basis of the provincial IFPs, （b） improving the use of market mechanisms for selection of IFP＇s executives, （c） implementing the lifelong accountability of investment and financing decisions of China＇ s local government officials, （d） strengthening the IFPs＇ autonomy as independent legal-agent and market actors, and （e） perfecting the evaluation, promotion and incentive systems of local government officials.

关 键 词：地方政府 投融资平台 委托-代理 政府担保 激励 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]