官员到访减轻了企业税收负担吗——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Can Official Visits Relieve Corporate Tax Burden? Empirical Evidences from China's Listed Companies

作　　者：洪群 戴亦一[2] 

机构地区：[1]闽南师范大学商学院,福建漳州363000 [2]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《当代财经》2018年第1期111-121,共11页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"宗族文化与公司财务行为:基于族谱与姓氏的研究"(71772155);福建省教育厅中青年项目"独立董事在企业环境信息披露中的作用研究--基于闽企的经验证据"(JAS170252)

摘　　要：以2004—2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,利用手工收集的官员到访数据,实证检验了官员到访对企业税收负担的影响。结果显示:官员到访能够显著减轻企业税收负担,与非官员到访企业相比,官员到访企业具有更低的适用税率和实际所得税率。进一步研究发现,官员到访对企业税收负担的减轻作用,不仅受到产权性质和新企业所得税法实施的影响,而且因"一把手"机制和到访目的而存在差异,即官员到访的税负效应仅存在于非国有企业和税改后公司中;与非党政领导班子成员到访相比,只有党政班子成员到访才能减轻企业的税收负担;视察和调研等指导性官员到访能使企业税率显著下降,但检查和督察等监督性官员到访会加重企业的税收负担。Taking China＇s A-share listed companies during the period of 2004-2014 as the samples, this paper empirically examines the influence of official visits on corporate tax burden with the hand-collected data of official visits. The findings show that official visits can significantly relieve corporate tax burden. Compared with the enterprises visited by non-officials, the enterprises visited by officials have lower applicable tax rate and real income tax rate. Further study shows that the tax burden relieving effect of official visits is not only affected by the nature of property right and the implementation of the new Law of Corporation Income Tax, but also has differences due to the ＂top leader＂ mechanism and the different visiting purposes, i.e., the tax burden effect of official visits exists only in non-state-owned enterprises and companies with reformed tax system. Compared with the visits of non-Party and government leadership members, only the visits of the Party and government leadership members can relieve the tax burden on enterprises. The inspective and investigative visits of the instructive officials can significantly relieve enterprises＇ tax rate, while the checking and supervising visits of the supervising officials can induce heavier tax burden on the enterprises.

关 键 词：官员到访 税收负担 适用税率 实际所得税率 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]