企业政治关联与过度投资的相关性研究——基于我国民营上市公司的经验证据  

A Study on the Correlation Between Political Connection and Over-Investment in Private Listed Companies in China

作　　者：郭世辉[1] 朱雨辰[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2018年第1期12-18,共7页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：文章以2013-2015年沪、深A股民营上市公司为研究样本,从政治关联存在性、程度与强度以及类型三个层次构建政治关联综合分析模型,分析政治关联与过度投资之间的相关性。研究发现:政治关联引发我国民营企业过度投资水平更高;民营企业过度投资水平随政治关联程度提高而上升,但不会随着政治关联强度的增强而升高;独立董事型政治关联并未抑制民营企业过度投资,其他高管型政治关联则显著加剧民营企业过度投资。This paper analyzes the relationship between political association and over-investment from the three levels of political association existence, political association degree and intensity, also political connec- tion typetaking the sample of private affiliated companies from 2013 to 2015 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A store market. It is showed that the political association will lead toa much more excessive investment of pri- vate enterprises in China, This kind of excessive investment will increase with the intensity of political as- sociation, but the degree. Independent directors, political association will not restrain the private enterprises over-investment,but other executive-style political association will significantly increase the excessive in- vestment in private enterprises.

关 键 词：政治关联 过度投资 民营上市公司 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]