论海德格尔关于康德先验想象力之根源地位的讨论  

Heidegger's Discussion about Kantian Transcendental Imagination's Position as Common Root

作　　者：姚宇臣 高海青[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系,北京100871 [2]广东外语外贸大学国外马克思主义研究中心,广东广州510420

出　　处：《武陵学刊》2018年第1期50-57,共8页Journal of Wuling

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"技术时代的精神状况:在马克思主义与现象学之间"(15YJC720008)

摘　　要：为了给作为有限人类知识基础的形而上学进行重新奠基,海德格尔在《康德与形而上学疑难》一书中将可以进行纯粹综合的先验想象力视作感性和知性的根源。想象力作为一种源初的综合能力通过纯粹综合,将直观的综观和知性的述谓式与命题式综合转化为亚综合形式,统摄于其下,同时,想象力在显现对象境域的过程中扮演了核心角色,因而确立了人类知识的有限性,也确立了自己作为知性和感性共同根源的地位。除此之外,深入想象力的德文原词及其身后的传统,可以对想象力的根源地位有更深入的了解。In an effort to lay a new foundation of metaphysics on which the finitude of human knowledge is based, Heidegger makes transcendental imagination capable of pure synthesis the common root of sensibility and understanding in his book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. As an original power of synthesis,transcendental imagination incorporates synopsis by intuition and predictive/apophantic synthesis by understanding as subtypes of synthesis, meanwhile plays a pivotal role in making the horizon of objectivity manifest, thus constituting the finitude of human knowledge and establishing the original status of imagination as the common root. Apart from this, the ＂Common-Root Thesis＂ is further shed light upon by digging deeper into the original German word ＂Einbildungskraft＂ for imagination and the tradition of wordplay behind it.

关 键 词：海德格尔 康德 超越论想象力 人类知识的有限性 根源 纯粹综合 

分 类 号：B516.54[哲学宗教—外国哲学]