汽车召回中制造商与供应商策略选择的博弈  

Strategy Selection in the Automobile Recall between the Manufacturer and the Supplier Based on Game Theory

作　　者：董良才[1] 石茜 周娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学物流工程学院,上海200135

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2017年第24期48-56,共9页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金:电路量子电动力学系统中自旋量子比特相干调控的理论研究(11304196)

摘　　要：考虑到汽车召回过程中存在制造商单独承担召回责任、供应商单独承担召回责任、制造商与供应商合作承担召回责任以及均不承担召回责任四种情况,研究了这四种情况下供应商与制造商各自的收益.基于收益情况进行双方策略选择的博弈分析,发现没有外在约束的情况下制造商与供应商均不愿主动承担召回;供应商是否选择配合实施召回取决于供应商召回原因系数的大小;制造商可以通过对供应商实施惩罚支付或补偿支付来改变供应商的策略选择,从而实现供应链整体效益最大化.Considering there are four different kinds of automobile recall situations, which is the manufacturer recalls alone, the supplier recalls alone, manufacturer and supplier recall in corporation and none of manufacturer and supplier take charge for the recall, this paper researched the profit of both the automobile manufacturer and supplier under these four cases. We made a game analysis about their strategy choice based on the profit, and find that without external constraints none of the manufacturer and the supplier will take the responsibility for the recall of their accord; whether the supplier chooses to cooperate with the manufacturer to recall dependents on the supplier＇s size of the recall factor; the manufacturer can change the supplier＇s strategic choice by implementing penalty payments and compensation payments to the supplier, so as to maximize the overall efficiency of the supply chain.

关 键 词：汽车召回 博弈 召回原因系数 惩罚支付 补偿支付 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F407.471[经济管理—国民经济]