产出随机及贸易信用下农产品供应链农户决策与政府补偿价值  

Decisions and the Value of Government Compensation in Agricultural Supply Chain under Trade Credit and Uncertainty of Production Yield

作　　者：黄建辉[1,2] 叶飞[2] 周国林 

机构地区：[1]广东农工商职业技术学院管理系,广东广州510507 [2]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640 [3]广东金融学院工商管理学院,广东广州510521

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2018年第1期107-117,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172075);教育部高校博士点项目(20130172110029);教育部新世纪项目(NECT-13-0219);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(15YJC630037)

摘　　要：针对由单一公司和受资金约束单一农户组成的农产品供应链中融资难问题,考虑政府补偿公司预付货款损失及农产品产出随机性,分别构建了贸易信用下农户有、无破产风险的供应链博弈模型,并对比分析农户最优决策,最后探讨了政府补偿对社会福利及供应链的价值创造。研究表明,灾害年投入产出率越小,农户有破产风险的供应链决策模式对农户越有利;政府补偿策略不仅可化解公司预付货款损失风险和创造更多社会福利,还能激励农户制定更合理生产投入量,并提升供应链效率,且在一定条件下还可达到集中决策下最优期望利润水平,为供应链创造更多价值。Because of the high risk of agricultural supply chain financing and high cost of financing, the plight of agricultural supply chain financing becomes increasingly prominent, and seriously affects the development of agricultural modernization. To solve the supply chain financing difficulties of agricultural supply chain consisting of a capital--constrained farmer and an agribusiness firm, two different Stackel- berg game models, in which the agribusiness firm as the leader and the farmer as the follower, are pro- posed respectively by considering bankruptcy risks of the farmer in supply chain financing under trade cred- it and uncertainty of production yield. In the meanwhile, the comparative analysis on the farmer＇s optimal decision making is performed, and the government compensation values for both the social welfare and the supply chain are discussed finally. The fingdings can he drawn as follows：（1） the smaller the input-output rate of the bad year is, the more favorable supply chain financing model, in which the farmer has the risk of bankruptcy, is to the farmer; （2） the government compensation policies can reduce the agribusiness firm＇s risk of advance payment and create more social welfare; （3） the government compensation policies can also motivate the farmer to design the proper input quantity of production to promote the supply chain efficiency, even to realize the optimal expected profit of centralized decision- making under certain conditions, and create more value for the capital-constrained supply chain. Finally, the numerical study is given to demonstrate the conclusions. Our research results not only provide some managerial insight to the deci- sion-making of the farmer, but also help us have a new understanding of government compensation policies and recognize the importance of government compensation.

关 键 词：贸易信用 农户决策 政府补偿 资金约束 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]