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机构地区:[1]江苏省特种设备安全监督检验研究院扬州分院,扬州225003 [2]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,镇江212003
出 处:《江苏科技大学学报(自然科学版)》2017年第6期851-858,共8页Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology:Natural Science Edition
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271119);江苏省社科基金资助项目(13GLD019)
摘 要:为了研究科研院所与企业合作中的双向激励机制如何影响科研院所的核心竞争力,考虑合作双方的努力水平、边际激励强度、努力产出效率、努力成本系数、产品价格、研发项目价值增值等因素,构建合作双方的激励模型,研究合作中的双向激励机制对科研院所核心竞争力的影响.研究结果表明:在双向激励均衡条件下,随着科研院所得到的边际激励强度的增大,企业的努力水平将逐渐降低,反之亦然;合作项目的价值增值需要合作双方的协同努力,随着合作双方努力水平的增加,整体的价值增值则先增加后减小;考虑产品价格水平不断增长的条件,合作双方可以实现项目总体价值增值以及双方各自收益最大化.最后讨论了研究发现的管理启示.In order to study how the two-way incentive mechanism affects the core competitiveness of scientific research institutes during the cooperation of scientific research institutes and enterprises,we construct an incentive model for both parties which consider their effort level,marginal incentive intensity,output efficiency of effort,cost coefficient of effort,product price,value appreciation of RD project etc and study the influence of two-way incentive mechanism on the core competence of scientific research institutes. The results show that in the equlibirium conditivon of the two-way ercowagement,the level of enterprise 's efforts will be gradually reduced with the increase in the marginal incentive intensity of scientific research institutes,and vice versa. Project value-added depends on both sides' effort,and with their effort level increase,the overall value added will increase first and then reduce. Consider the growing price level of products,the two sides can achieve the overall value increases and at the same time the two sides maximize their own benefits. Finally,we discuss the management implications of the research findings.
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