网购平台与在线卖方在信誉评级中的合谋行为  

Research of collusion behavior between online shopping platform and online seller in the credit rating

作　　者：荣帅[1] 赵宏霞[2] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,辽宁葫芦岛125105 [2]渤海大学管理学院,辽宁锦州121013

出　　处：《辽宁工程技术大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第6期622-628,共7页Journal of Liaoning Technical University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71201012;71502017)

摘　　要：针对网购平台与在线卖方在信誉评级过程中的合谋行为,通过建立网购平台与在线卖方的动态博弈,在满足一定条件下可以得到结论:导致在线卖方与网购平台合谋刷取信誉分来欺骗消费者的主要原因包括消费者对信誉分数的过度依赖、合谋被发现的概率以及承受的损失过小等;网购平台的合谋动机甚至要大于在线卖方;信誉分数接近平均分数的在线卖方更有可能行贿网购平台来获取虚假信誉分数。The collusion between online platform and online seller in the credit rating process of online shopping platformfor online seller is studied in this paper. Through establishing the dynamic game model for e-commerce platform and online seller,in certain conditions,we can get the following conclusion： The main reasons that lead online sellers and online shopping platforms to cheat consumers by conspiracy to get credit points include the excessive reliance on credit scores, the probability of collusion discovery and the loss are too small, etc. Online shopping platform conspiracy motivation is even greater than online sellers, Online sellers whose credit scores are close to average scores are more likely to bribe online shopping platforms to obtain false reputation scores.

关 键 词：网络购物 信誉评级 合谋 质量管理 网购平台 在线卖方 诚信 博弈论 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]