基于动态演化博弈视角的技术赶超研究  

Technological Catching-up Based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：李丹丹[1] 陶秋燕[1] 何勤[1] 薛万欣[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京联合大学管理学院,北京100101

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2018年第3期30-36,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"我国自主创新型技术赶超发展战略与路径研究--基于跨学科协同的多层次整合研究"(12&ZD205);北京市教委社会科学计划一般项目"北京市政府与分享经济企业的演化博弈及监管机制研究"(2018-06-01);北京联合大学人才强校优选计划项目"分享经济时代共享单车认知网络的构建与政府规制策略研究"(BPHR2017DS14)

摘　　要：技术落后国家(地区)在进行技术赶超的过程中频繁出现经济持续发展、技术存量增加但无法实现技术赶超的现象,即与技术领先国家(地区)保持差距的赶超停滞。通过建立技术领先和技术落后国家(地区)之间的动态演化博弈模型,探讨双方博弈的稳定状态。研究表明:后发优势的存在使得技术落后国家(地区)的经济和技术水平不断提高,虽然单纯的技术模仿不能实现赶超,但是发展中国家(地区)却仍然在走技术模仿道路;而技术领先国家(地区)也会采取不阻碍赶超的策略,因为该状态是有利于整个社会经济持续发展的最优化状态。In the process of technological catching-up for developing region, economic development and technicalstock increase, but technological catching-up cannot be achieved. That is, technological gap is kept, and technologicalcatching-up is stopped. In this paper, the dynamic evolutionary game model between the leading region anddeveloping region is established, and the stability of the game is discussed. The results show that the existence of thebackward advantage makes the economic and technological level of the developing region increase continuously.Although the mere imitation of technology cannot achieve catching-up, the developing regions are still taking thisroad, and the leading region will adopt ＂not hinder＂ strategy. It is good for the entire social of economic development.This paper provides the theoretical basis for the strategy selection and policy formulation.

关 键 词：技术赶超 动态演化博弈 技术落后国家(地区) 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F124.3[经济管理—世界经济]