考察供应商具有双重行为偏好特征的供应链契约与协调  

Study on the Contracts and Coordination of Supply Chain with the Supplier’s Dual Behavior Preference

作　　者：赵婉鹛 叶春明[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海对外经贸大学国际经贸学院,上海201620

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2018年第1期23-29,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271138);上海理工大学科技发展基金资助项目(16KJFZ028)

摘　　要：在典型的二级供应链情境中探讨供应链领导者——供应商同时具有损失规避与公平关切双重行为偏好情形下，供应链成员通过契约实现协调的可行性与方式。建立了同时考虑供应商损失规避与公平关切双重行为偏好特征的效用函数；分别引入回购契约与收益共享契约两种典型的契约模式，结合效用函数表达式，讨论供应商追求效用最大化的同时实现供应链协调的可行性与必要条件。通过数理模型的推导与数值算例的分析得出：具有双重行为偏好特征的供应商，在其损失规避与公平关切程度一定的条件下，能够通过回购契约和收益共享契约实现供应链的协调。而在此过程中，双方的决策变量及各自收益也将随供应商损失规避与公平关切程度的变化发生变化，能否在促成供应链协调的同时实现各自的利益需求，是双方能否最终达成合作的关键。The feasibilities and methods of contractual coordination were discussed in a typical two-echelon supply chain in which the supplier acts as the leader and has dual behavioral preferences： loss aversion and fair concern. A new utility-function was established that takes supplier＇s dual behavioral preferences into account and introduces two typical contract forms. buy-back contract and revenue-sharing contract. According to the utility function expression, the feasibilities and necessary methods for supply chain coordination were discussed in condition that the supplier pursuitsits maximum utility. The following conclusions are drawn through the deduction of mathematical models and the analysis of numerical examples：Supplier who has dual behavioral preferences can still prompt supply chain coordination through buy-back contract and revenue-sharing contract under certain conditions, but both the supply chain members＇decision variables and incomes may be changed with the changes of the supplier＇s loss aversion degree and fairness concerns degree. The key for the two members to reach a final agreement will lie in whether each of them can achieve their own benefits and needs.

关 键 词：行为供应链 双重行为偏好 供应链契约 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]