研发投资决策下的现金股利分配:抑制还是迎合——兼论“半强制分红政策”的监管悖论  

R&D Investment and Cash Dividend Distribution:Constraining or Catering——New Perspective on “Semi Mandatory Dividend Policy”

作　　者：杨宝[1] 万伟[1] Daisy Chow 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学会计学院,重庆400054 [2]Business School, Otago University, New Zealand

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2018年第3期94-109,共16页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“中国上市公司现金分红指数的构建及其应用研究”(15CJY006)

摘　　要：研发和股利分配同属于财务分配的范畴，二者存在现金流竞争。基于2007—2015年沪深A股上市公司数据的实证研究表明：研发投资对现金分红决策具有正向影响，现金流竞争强化了研发投资对现金分红的正向效应；证监会的“半强制分红政策”是导致上市公司“边研发、边分红”这一“研发一分红”关系悖论的原因，而“研发一分红”悖论会带来负面的财务效应；中国上市公司出现“研发一分红”关系悖论这一财务现象，说明证监会实施的“半强制分红政策”存在不足。Traditional theory suggests that both R＆D and payout are income allocation activities, where exists a cash flow compe- tition. In this paper, using the samples of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015, we investigate the impact of R＆D on payout. Empirical results show that R＆D investments of Chinese listed firms generally have positive influence on dividend distribution policy. This positive effect is more pronounced when there is fierce internal cash competition between R＆D and payout. We argue that, tile semi mandatory dividend policy, issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission, leads to the positive relationship between R＆D and payout. Further analysis suggests that, above interaction would bring negative financial effect. The empirical evidence reveals that semi-mandatory dividend policy （SMDP） has its own deficiencies.

关 键 词：研发投资 现金分红 半强制分红政策 现金流 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]