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机构地区:[1]东南大学经济管理学院,南京211189 [2]安徽财经大学统计与应用数学学院,蚌埠233030
出 处:《系统工程理论与实践》2018年第2期390-400,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基 金:安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKQ2015D56);科技创新战略研究专项项目(ZLY2015108);江苏省软科学研究计划项目(BR2017041);安徽省高校人文社科研究重点项目(SK2017A0453)~~
摘 要:考虑到企业在采纳新技术过程中的技术溢出以及新技术创新回报的不确定性,建立生产有差异化产品企业的两阶段博弈模型,以企业采纳时间为分界点分别得出在古诺竞争和伯特兰德竞争两种市场下各个阶段的期望均衡利润,进而对技术创新回报不确定性、企业的最优采纳时间、期望社会福利最大时的企业最优社会采纳时间进行了分析.结果表明,随着创新回报不确定性的增加,先采纳新技术企业的期望利润增加更多;企业间产品差异较大时,领先企业在古诺竞争下的最优采纳时间要比伯特兰德竞争下的最优采纳时间要早;企业间产品差异较小时,领先企业在古诺竞争下的最优采纳时间要晚于伯特兰德竞争下的最优采纳时间.跟随企业在古诺竞争下的最优采纳时间始终早于伯特兰德竞争下的最优采纳时间.Taking into account the technological spillover and the uncertainty of new technological innovations returns in the process of adopting new technologies, this paper establishes a two-stage game model for firms producing differentiated products, and derives expected equilibrium profit of various stages in the two markets of Cournot competition and Bertrand competition under which adoption time is the demarcation point. Furthermore, the uncertainty of new technological innovations returns and the optimal adoption time of firms are analyzed. The results show that, expected profits of the leading firm increase more, with the increasing uncertainty of innovative returns. When differences between firms' products are large, the optimal adoption time of the leading firm under Cournot competition is earlier than the optimal time under Bertrand competition. When differences between firms' products are small, the optimal adoption time of the leading firm under Cournot competition is later than the optimal time under Bertrand competition. The optimal adoption time of the following firm under Cournot competition is always earlier than the optimal time under Bertrand competition.
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