我国食品安全监管中的政企合谋与最优防范机制  

Collusion between local government and firm of food safety regulatory and the optimal collusion-proof mechanism in China

作　　者：张云辉[1] 霍士琦 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学经济学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《科技与管理》2017年第6期33-38,共6页Science-Technology and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJCZH295)

摘　　要：我国食品安全监管由中央政府委托地方政府监管审核食品企业实施,在这种监管模式下,地方政府扮演着管理者的角色。由于我国地方官员GDP导向的政绩考核制度,道德风险的发生概率非常高,可能造成地方政府与食品企业合谋,使食品安全监管失效。通过建立中央政府—地方政府—食品企业—媒体防范契约模型,以防范政企合谋为目的,设计最优防范机制,解释了引入媒体参与监管的制度设计的有效性。研究表明:严格审核食品企业的市场准入,降低媒体参与监管的交易成本,提升媒体的监管地位可以有效防范政企合谋。The central government has commissioned the local governments to supervise the food enterprises about the food safety regulatory. In this mode, the local government plays a key role in management. Under the system of performance evaluation in China＇s local officials, the local government overemphasizes the GDP, which greatly im- proves the probability of occurrence of moral hazard or result in the collusion between the local government and the food enterprises, which makes the food safety regulatory invalid. This paper, through the establishment of the cen- tral government-local government-food enterprises-media prevention contract model, prevents the collusion between local government and enterprises for the purpose of the design of the best preventive mechanism to explain the intro- duction of media participation in the regulation of the effectiveness of the system design. Research shows that the collusion between government and enterprise can be prevented through strictly reviewing food market access, re- duceing the media involved in regulatory transaction costs, enhancing the regulatory position of the media.

关 键 词：食品安全监管 合谋 委托代理 防范机制 

分 类 号：F123.16[经济管理—世界经济]