产权性质、政府补贴与企业研发投入——基于政治寻租视角  

Property Rights,Government Subsidies and R&D Investment——Based on the Perspective of Political Rent-seeking

作　　者：邓若冰 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学经济学院

出　　处：《软科学》2018年第3期5-9,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA024)

摘　　要：利用中国2010~2015年A股上市企业数据,基于新政治经济学中的寻租理论,实证检验了政府补贴对不同产权类型企业研发投入的影响,以及政治寻租对政府研发补贴效应的调节作用。结果显示：企业争取政府补贴行为存在明显的寻租倾向,并且相较于国有企业,寻租活动更有助于民营企业获得更多的政府补贴;政府补贴对企业研发投入具有“挤入”效应,并且对民营企业效应更强;寻租活动倾向于弱化政府研发补贴效应。为此,有必要通过加强企业补贴资格审查制度建设、加快金融体制改革、建立公平市场竞争环境等措施激发企业研发积极性,逐步提升我国企业创新能力。Based on the political rent-seeking theory, this paper examined the impact of government subsidies on R＆D in- vestment of different types of enterprises and the moderating effect of political rent-seeking on the effect of government R＆D subsidy through the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2015. Result found that enterprises striving for government subsidies had obvious rent-seeking behavior tendency, and compared with the state-owned enterprises, rent-see- king can help private enterprises obtain more government subsidy. Secondly, government subsidies had a ＂squeeze in＂ effect on R＆D investment, and had a greater effect on private enterprises than state-owned enterprises. Rent-seeking activi- ties tend to weaken the government＇s R＆D subsidy effect. Therefore, it＇s necessary to strengthen the construction of enter- prise subsidy qualification examination system, speed up the reform of the financial system, and establish a fair market com- petition environment in order to stimulate the enthusiasm of enterprise R＆D, and enhance the innovation capability of Chi- nese enterprises.

关 键 词：政治寻租 研发投入 政府补贴 产权性质 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]