隐喻研究认识论的前提性批判——“假物说”与“指事说”的理论意蕴  

The premise criticism of epistemology of the study of metaphor

作　　者：徐盛桓[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南大学外语学院,河南开封475001

出　　处：《外语教学》2018年第2期1-6,共6页Foreign Language Education

摘　　要：对于隐喻运用机制,古今中外有学者认为,其基础性的因素或要动用到"物",或要指称"事",这可分别称为"假物说"与"指事说"。然而,不基于"事"的自然物,例如自然界里客观存在的江河湖海,其价值和意义是难以确定的,只有参与到"事"的"物"才被赋予一定的意义。这样看来隐喻运用的基础性因素,归根到底是"事"而不是本然形态的"物",不宜笼统地提"通过一物以理解和经验另一物",只用本体论事实的分析是不够完善的,还须要引进本体论承诺的分析。从"假物说"发展为"指事说",是对纯粹本然状态的物的扬弃,也意味着承诺该物之现实应然性。隐喻里的"物"是本然存在的物与体现了主体目的性与语境制约下物的意义和价值的统一,这样的统一是由做"事"而获得的。There have been scholars,in China and abroad,in modern times and in the past,who hold that the fundamental factors of metaphor mechanism are either things specified or events used. These are respectively named the idea of ＂understanding one kind of thing in terms of another＂and that of ＂experiencing one kind of event in terms of another＂. Yet natural things not involved in the events,such as naturally-born brooks,rivers,lakes and oceans,can hardly show their meanings and values of their own. This being the case,the fundamental factors of metaphor mechanism are basically the events,not the natural things; therefore it is not appropriate to claim that the understanding of a metaphor is by means of one kind of thing in terms of another. Neither is it well-established to analyze metaphorical expression only through ontological facts,but also through ontological commitments. The development from the idea of＂understanding one kind of thing in terms of another＂to the idea of＂understanding one kind of event in terms of another＂is not only to discard the meaning and value of purely natural existence of thing,but also to mean abruptly committing the realistic necessity of the thing. The thing expressed in metaphor is the unity of its natural existence mixed with its meaning and value produced from the context and the subject＇s intention,and such unity comes from the event committed.

关 键 词：隐喻与类比隐喻 物 事 本体论承诺 

分 类 号：H030[语言文字—语言学]