企业在拓展市场谈判中的博弈分析  

Game Playing Analysis of Enterprises in Negotiation of Expanding Market

作　　者：史艳维[1] 马春晖[2] 翟美娟[2] SHI Yan-wei1 MA Chun-hui2 ZHAI Mei-juan2(1. School of Intelligent Science and Information Engineering, Xi＇an Peihua University, Xi＇an 710125, China; 2. School of Science, Xi＇an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi＇an 710055, Chin)

机构地区：[1]西安培华学院智能科学与信息工程学院,陕西西安710125 [2]西安建筑科技大学理学院,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《现代营销（下）》2018年第2期146-147,共2页Marketing Management Review

基　　金：西安培华学院校级科研课题"追求差别化市场中的博弈分析"(编号:PHKT17001);西安建筑科技大学基础研究基金(编号:JC1709)

摘　　要：本文在双寡头垄断模型下,分析了企业在拓展市场谈判中的纳什均衡.首先,规定了企业的谈判规则.其次,证明了每个有效分配都是纯策略纳什均衡.最后,在市场中存在固定不可分配的份额情况下,给出了纳什均衡条件.In this paper, Nash equilibriums are analyzed in enterprises＇ s negotiation of expanding market in duopoly model. Firstly, the rules of enterprises＇s negotiation are provided. Then, it is proved that every effective allocation is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. At last, Nash equilibrium is shown in the market with fixed undistributable share.

关 键 词：双头垄断模型 有效分配 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]