剩余监管权的逻辑和困境——基于食品安全监管体制的分析  

Logic and Dilemma of Residual Regulation:Analysis of Food Safety Regulatory Regime in China

作　　者：胡颖廉[1] 

机构地区：[1]国家行政学院社会和文化教研部

出　　处：《江海学刊》2018年第2期129-137,共9页Jianghai Academic Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目"新时期中国特色应急管理体系的顶层设计和模式重构"(项目号:91224009)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：西方发达国家监管机构普遍具有独立、专业、自主的特征。与此不同,我国监管体制建设正在经历地方分权、综合执法的反向运动,即从"垂直分段"模式演变为"属地整合"模式。中央基于不完备委托代理关系赋予地方政府兜底性剩余监管权,而非限于固定单一职权,是监管型国家在中国实践的重要特征。其符合监管体制演变的逻辑,短期内有利于增加监管资源投入,但并未激发地方提升食品安全保障水平的内生动力。现行体制面临政策目标内生冲突、资源与事权结构性错配、监管行为逆向激励等困境。要构建统一、权威、专业的监管体制,必须全面优化剩余监管权。这一现象在其他社会监管领域同样存在,从而成为新时代中国特色监管型国家建设的重大命题。Regulatory agencies in western countries are normally independent and professional. However,regulatory regime in China is experiencing a transition from "vertical segmentation"to "territorial integration". Incomplete principal agent relation between central authority and local government leads to the residual regulation,which increases resource input while not motivating inner incentive of food safety performance. In order to overcome the conflict of policy goals and structural mismatch between resource and regulatory function,it is necessary to construct an united,authoritative and professional regulatory regime to optimize the residual regulation,which also exists in other social regulation fields,therefore,becoming the important theme of national construction with Chinese characteristics in the new era.

关 键 词：政府监管 机构改革 剩余监管权 中央地方关系 食品安全 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]