反收购条款影响高管变更的机理研究——来自交错董事会条款的经验证据  

Research on the Mechanism That Antitakeover Provisions Affect Executive Turnover: Empirical Evidence from Staggered Board Provisions

作　　者：袁天荣[1] 徐明亮 潘临 YUAN Tian-rong;XU Ming-liang;PAN Lin(School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, Chin)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2018年第2期77-84,共8页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13BJY014);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(12YJA630181)

摘　　要：在资本市场不断开放的情形下,控制权市场活跃度日益增加,上市公司为了维护公司控制权的稳定,纷纷设置反收购条款予以应对,但是反收购条款会给公司带来什么经济后果,国内研究较少,特别是交错董事会条款是否会对高管变更产生影响?而内部治理又会起到怎样的调节作用?现有国内文献尚未关注。利用手工搜集的交错董事会条款样本数据,检验了交错董事会条款与高管变更之间的关系。实证结果表明,上市公司设置交错董事会条款有利于降低高管的非正常变更。当上市公司股权结构较分散、高管持股比例较少、内部董事较少、董事长和总经理两职分离时,交错董事会条款抑制高管非正常变更的作用更加明显。With the continuous opening up of capital market and the increasingly active control market, the lis- ted companies have set up antitakeover provisions to maintain the stability of corporate control. But few studies at home have been done on the economic consequences of antitakeover provisions, especially as to whether stag- gered board provisions affect executive turnover, and how internal governance plays a role in its regulation. U- sing the sample data of staggered board provisions collected by hand, this paper tests their relationships with ex- ecutive turnover, showing that staggered board provisions set up by the listed companies are conducive to reduc- ing the possibility of abnormal executive turnover. With the scattered ownership, less percentage of executive ownership, less internal directors and the separated roles of chairman and general manager, the staggered board provisions in the listed companies play a more obvious role in restraining the possibility of abnormal executive turnover.

关 键 词：反收购条款 交错董事会条款 内部治理 高管变更 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]