道德准则的普遍性与情境的特殊性如何兼顾——论朱熹对程颐经权理论的继承与完善  

Compatibility of Universality of Moral Standards and Particularity of Moral Situations: On Zhu Xi's Inheritance and Perfection of Cheng Yi's Theory of Jing and Quan

作　　者：赵清文[1] ZHAO Qing-wen(College of Philosophy and Public Administration, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, Chin)

机构地区：[1]河南大学哲学与公共管理学院,河南开封475004

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2018年第2期131-136,共6页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17BZX104)

摘　　要：针对汉儒"反经合道为权"的理论可能导致的道德准则的普遍约束力降低而使人的行为流入权术、变诈的风险,程颐提出了"权即是经"的观点。朱熹一方面对程颐的观点表示同情和理解,另一方面又不赞成他将"权"与"经"直接同一的做法。因此,他提出了"经是已定之权,权是未定之经"的命题,既避免了程颐的理论可能导致的混淆"经""权"概念的弊端,又承绪了程颐强调道德准则普遍性的立场。In terms of the risk of power and fraud in the conduct of human out of the debased general binding of moral standards that may be caused by the theory of Han Dynasty Confucianism defining ＂quan, weighing of cir- cumstances, as conforming to moral principles while violatingfing, standard of conduct＂, Cheng Yi puts forward that ＂weighing of circumstances is the standard of conduct＂. While expressing his sympathy and understanding of Chen Yi＇ s view, Zhu Zi disagrees with his point of directly equating ＂weighing of circumstances＂ with ＂the standard of conduct＂. Hence, he puts forward the proposition that ＂the standard of conduct is the established weighing of circumstances while weighing of circumstances is the undetermined standard of conduct＂, correcting the defects of confusing the two in Cheng Yi＇ s theory while inheriting Cheng Yi＇ s standpoint that emphasizes the universality of moral principle.

关 键 词：道德准则 道德情境 经权观 程颐 朱熹 

分 类 号：B244.6[哲学宗教—中国哲学] B244.7