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作 者:王聪 陈燕[1] 杨德礼 WANG Cong;CHEN Yan;YANG De-li(School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116024, China;Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China)
机构地区:[1]大连海事大学交通运输管理学院,辽宁大连116024 [2]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024
出 处:《工业工程与管理》2018年第2期76-84,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271039,71372083);国家社会科学基金资助项目(13CJL059);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(3132017090)
摘 要:制造商拥有自建平台后,仍有加入第三方大型电商平台的可能。针对一个拥有自建平台的制造商、一个传统零售商和一个可选择的大型电子商务平台,建立了不同渠道运营策略下的供应链Stackelberg主从博弈模型,得到了不同渠道策略的均衡条件和均衡结果,并比较了制造商不同策略对供应链成员利润的影响。研究结果表明,制造商在自建电商平台不同发展阶段,会采用不同的渠道运营策略。研究还发现,制造商加入第三方电商平台总是损害传统零售商的利益,而自建平台作为制造商唯一电子渠道时,制造商与零售商存在“双赢”的局面。The manufacturer who owns an e-commerce platform still has the possibility to join in a large third-party platform. A system consists of a manufacturer,a retailer and an e-commerce platform was considered, and Stackelberg game models were established according to different operating strategies of the manufacturer. The equilibrium conditions and equilibrium results in different game models are gotten, and the equilibrium profits of supply chain members in different strategies were compared. The results show that the manufacturer adopts different channel operating strategies in different development stages of self-constructed e-commerce platform. Furthermore, it is found that the manufacturer joining the third-party e-commerce platform always damages the interests of the traditional retailer. However, there is a "win-win" situation, when the manufacturer takes the self-constructed e-commerce platform as the unique e-channel.
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