考虑预售和质量报露的易逝品供应链销售策略研究  

Study on Supply Chain Sales Strategy for Perishable Product with Advance Selling and Quality Disclosure

作　　者：蒋渊 马士华[1] JIANG Yuan;MA Shi-hua(School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, Chin)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2018年第2期85-90,97,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472069)

摘　　要：针对一个仅存在产品质量信息不对称的供应链系统，考虑需求同时受产品质量和价格影响的情况下供应链的最优决策问题。建立了零售商和制造商的Stackelberg博弈模型，探究零售商的预售决策和制造商的质量披露决策对双方均衡期望收益的影响。结果表明，预售模式下零售商的利润总是优于不采取预售策略的情形。但是对于零售商来说，制造商的质量披露行为会损害其利益；此外，计算得到了制造商进行质量披露的临界质量披露成本。The optimal decisions are studied when the demand depends on prices and quality in a supply chain setting in which product quality information is the only source of asymmetry. The Stackelberg game models are analyzed to investigate the effect of advance-selling and quality disclosure decision on the supply chain members＇ expected revenue. The results show that both retailer＇s and manufacture＇ s profit improves under advance-selling circumstance. However, quality disclosure is detrimental to retailer＇s profit. In addition, the critical value of the disclosure cost influencing manufacturer＇s choice is identified.

关 键 词：预售 质量披露 易逝品 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]