考虑利他偏好的供应链定价和减排决策  

Decisions of Pricing and Reduction Rate in Supply Chain Considering Altruism Preference

作　　者：程茜 汪传旭[1] 徐朗[1] CHENG Xi;WANG Chuan-xu;XU Lang(School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2018年第2期159-166,179,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(71373157);上海海事大学研究生创新项目(2016ycx074);上海海事大学优秀博士论文培育项目(2016BXLP005);上海海事大学学术新人培育项目(YXR2017035)

摘　　要：考虑消费者具有低碳偏好和政府征收碳税，引入供应链成员的利他偏好属性，分别建立了完全自利下、零售商具有利他偏好下和制造商具有利他偏好下的供应链定价和减排决策模型，并分析了供应链利他偏好属性对供应链成员决策的影响。分析结果表明，在碳税政策下，只有利他偏好系数较小的零售商才会愿意与完全自利型的制造商合作，而零售商的利他行为在一定程度上能够促进制造商减排。无论零售商还是制造商存在利他偏好，制造商均会提高碳减排率，且政府碳税能促进制造商碳减排率的提高。Considering consumers＇ low carbon preference and government＇s carbon taxes, the altruism behavior of supply chain members was introduced. Pricing and carbon emissions reduction decision models were developed under completely selfish preference, retailers＇ altruism and manufacturers＇ altruism. The influence of altruism preferences was investigated on the optimal decisions of supply chains. It shows that if the altruistic preferences of retailer are low enough,retailer is willing to cooperate with the selfish manufacturers, and retailers＇ altruistic preferences can promote manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions in a certain extent. Either manufacturers or retailers are altruistic,manufacturers will invest in emission reduction so as to improve the rate of carbon reduction. The rate of carbon reduction can be accelerated through government＇ s carbon taxes.

关 键 词：利他偏好 碳减排 政府碳税 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]