考虑商户广告投资的网上交易平台定价  

Pricing in online trading market with endogenous sellers’ advertising investment

作　　者：耿阳 张玉林[1] GENG Yang;ZHANG Yulin(School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China)

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2018年第4期910-919,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71671036,71171046)~~

摘　　要：在商户广告投资内生化和双边平台特性下，建立两阶段动态博弈模型，研究网上交易平台的最优定价及利润．研究表明：1）平台定价策略受广告效果和平台固有效果两种作用的影响．广告效果相对平台固有效果较小时，商户实力（与投资预算有关）的相对差距较小，平台定价策略倾向于让所有商户都加入；广告效果相对较大时，平台会根据商户实力的相对差距制定定价策略，差距越小（大），平台希望吸引的商户就越多（少）．2）商户价格敏感性较高时，平台定价较低，利润较小．商户外部性较大时，平台应吸引更多的商户．特别地，广告效果相对较小时，商户外部性越大，平台定价越高．On a monopolistic online trading platform where sellers make advertising investment decisions through the platform endogenously and the investments will be part of the platform＇s revenue, this paper build a two-stage dynamic game model to study a classic pricing problem in this common two-sided platform. The main conclusions show that the platform＇s pricing strategy is influenced by the effect of advertising and the inherent effect of the platform. When the effect of advertising is relatively small, the sellers＇ strength gap related to the investment budget will therefore be less, and the pricing strategy is to let all sellers join. Alternatively, when it is relatively large, the pricing strategy is decided according to the size of sellers＇ strength gap, and the smaller the gap, the lower the sellers＇ market-entry barrier. It means the platform should attract mo^e small sellers ：f the gap is small. In addition, the optimal price （seller＇s membership fee） and profit of the platform decrease with sellers＇ sensitivity of membership fee, and the platform should attract more sellers with a high seller＇s externality. Specifically, the platform＇s optimal price increases with the seller＇s externality when the effect of advertising is relatively small.

关 键 词：双边市场 平台定价 广告投资 内生化 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]