审计委员会权力侵蚀、管理层激励与盈余质量  

Audit Committee Power Erosion,Management Incentives and Earnings Quality

作　　者：张川[1,2,3] 黄夏燕 ZHANG Chuan;HUANG Xiayan(School of Business, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306 [2]上海电力学院,上海201306 [3]上海电机学院,上海201306

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2018年第3期40-51,共12页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272218);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372069);国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(71702096);上海海事大学研究生创新基金项目(2015ycx066)

摘　　要：以2012—2016年A股上市公司为研究样本,探讨管理层权力在审计委员会内部对审计委员会治理效力所产生的影响。研究发现,审计委员会权力侵蚀对上市公司盈余质量有显著的负向作用,而管理层激励可以调节审计委员会权力侵蚀与盈余质量之间的负向关联。这表明上市公司治理机制失衡与管理层干涉会削弱审计委员会的治理效力,但有效的激励机制可以缓解管理层的自利行为及其对审计委员会的操控。研究结论表明,企业应当规范治理结构、协调制衡机制,监督独立、制衡有效是公司健康有效运行和维护中小股东利益的重要前提。This paper examines how managerial power affects the governance effectiveness within the audit committee from the cases of A-share listed companies during 2012—2016. Studies show that the power erosion of the audit committee has a negative effect on the earnings quality of listed companies,while the management incentives can regulate the negative association between them. This paper indicates that the imbalance of governance mechanism and management intervention will weaken the governance effectiveness of the audit committee,but the effective incentive mechanism can ease the self-interested behavior of management and the manipulation of the audit committee. In this paper,the executive director of the audit committee as the object of research,the impact of the managerial power on the audit committee is transferred from outside to internal,providing a new perspective to explore the underlying factors of the effectiveness of the audit committee.

关 键 词：审计委员会 管理层权力 管理层激励 盈余质量 审计意见 审计质量 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F234.43[经济管理—会计学]