自然价值论论证的困境及其症结——从杜威的视域看  

Dilemma and Crux of Value Theory of Nature——From the Prospective of John Dewey

作　　者：孔成思[1] KONG Chengsi(School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《云梦学刊》2018年第3期44-49,共6页Journal of Yunmeng

摘　　要：自然的价值评价问题是自然价值论证成的核心要素,也是环境伦理学中两类"中心主义"长年争论的焦点。在自然价值论从终极目的到终极之善,再到主体价值的论证路径中,目的论传统贯穿始终。杜威认为它无视道德具体情景中的价值冲突,将经验与自然、价值与事实、目的与手段割裂开来,这是其证成困境的症结所在。因此对自然的价值评价,应摒弃造成人与自然二元对立的目的论传统,将自然视为经验环境,在与人交互的连续性进程中对自然做出价值评价。Evaluating the value of nature is the core element of the value theory of nature, and also the center of concern of two kinds of ＂centrism＂ in environmental ethics. The value theory of nature goes from the ultimate goal to the ultimate good, and to the subjective value, in which the teleological tradition runs through. From the point of Dewey’s view, it disregards the conflict of value in moral practical situation, and separates the experience from the natural, the value from the fact, the ends from the means, which is the crux of its plight. Therefore, evaluation of nature’s value should abandon the binary opposition of man and nature caused by traditional teleology, and regard nature as an experience of the environment. Then it helps to evaluate the value of nature in the continuous process of interactions with people.

关 键 词：终极目的 自然价值论 价值评价 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]