交错董事会、制度环境与公司绩效  

Staggered Boards,Institutional Environment and Corporate Performance

作　　者：徐明亮 袁天荣[1] 许汝俊[1] XU Ming-liang;YUAN Tian-rong;XU Ru-jun(School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, Chin)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2018年第5期101-113,共13页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13BJY014);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(12YJA630181)

摘　　要：随着控制权市场的激活,上市公司设置反收购条款的现象越来越多,反收购条款会给公司带来什么经济后果,国内相关研究较少,特别是交错董事会与公司绩效有什么关系?制度环境对两者的关系又有何影响?国内学者尚未研究。本文利用手工搜集的数据,对上述问题展开研究。研究结果表明,交错董事会制度提升了公司绩效,而良好的制度环境能够促进交错董事会对公司绩效的正面影响。当投资保护法律水平越高、政府干预程度越低、市场化水平越高的情况下,交错董事会提升公司绩效的作用越明显。上述现象表明,交错董事会制度作为上市公司自主制定的章程条款,发挥了有效的章程自治功能,而良好的外部制度环境能够起到推动作用。这也为监管部门引导上市公司制定章程自治条款提供了政策建议。With the activation of control market, more and more listed companies have set up anti-takeover provisions. There are few domestic studies on the economic consequences of the anti takeover provisions. How do staggered boards affect corporate performance and how does the insti- tutional environment affect their relationship？ It has not been studied in China. Using the sample data collected by hand, this paper shows that the staggered boards enhance the performance of the company, and the favorable institutional environment can promote the positive influence of stag- gered boards on corporate performance. The role of staggered boards to enhance the company＇s performance is more obvious when the level of investment protection law is higher, the degree of government intervention is lower and the marketization level is higher. The phenomenon shows that the staggered boards play an role of effective autonomy, and a good external institutional environ- ment can promote its effective autonomy function. It also provides policy advice for regulators to guide listed companies to develop articles of association.

关 键 词：反收购条款 交错董事会 制度环境 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]