基于异质品双渠道的制造商供应链选择与决策研究  

Research on Manufacturers' Supply Chain Selection and Decision-making based on Heterogeneous Products Dual Channels

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作  者:邓丽红[1] 侯雨涵 DENG Li-hong;HOU Yu-han(School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China)

机构地区:[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,哈尔滨150001

出  处:《商业研究》2018年第4期103-110,共8页Commercial Research

基  金:国家社会科学基金资助项目;项目编号:11CSH039;黑龙江省应用技术研究与开发计划软科学资助项目;项目编号:GC16D116;黑龙江省科技攻关软科学资助重点项目;项目编号:GB14D203

摘  要:本文采用Stackelberg博弈模型分析异质品双渠道条件下制造商供应链选择与决策问题,并讨论两种异质品在传统渠道销售、传统和电子渠道同时销售、传统和电子渠道分别销售不同供应链结构情况下需求、定价以及收益方面的差异。研究表明:引入电子渠道导致零售商最终利润下降,采用传统和电子渠道分别销售两种异质品的双渠道结构将导致整体供应链利润的减少,无法有效解决渠道冲突;制造商所获利润与新产品消费者数量成正比,与产品差异系数成反比;制造商在不断增加消费者对电子渠道接受程度时,应根据自身产品更新速度锁定合适的发展地区。This paper uses Stackelberg game model to analyze the supply chain selection and decision-making of manufacturers under the condition of heterogeneity products dual-channels,and the differences of demand,pricing and revenue are discussed respectively in three cases that they are sold in traditional channels,in traditional and electronic channels at the same time and in traditional and electronic channels individually. The study shows that the introduction of echannels leads to a decline in retailers' final profits,and the case that two heterogeneous products are sold in traditional and electronic channels individually will lead to a reduction in overall supply chain profits,which cannot effectively resolve channel conflicts; the profit of the manufacturer is directly proportional to the number of new product consumers and are inversely proportional to the product variance coefficient; in addition to continuing to increase consumers' acceptance of electronic channels,manufacturers should target appropriate development areas based on the speed of product updates.

关 键 词:双渠道 供应链 异质品 STACKELBERG博弈 仿真 

分 类 号:F274[经济管理—企业管理] C934[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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