高管声誉影响了上市公司权力配置吗?——双重代理关系框架下的实证研究  

Does Executive Reputation Influence the Power Distribution of Listed Companies?——An Empirical Study on the Framework of Double Agency Relationship

作　　者：徐宁[1] 吴皞玉 XU Ning;WU Hao-yu(School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2018年第6期31-44,共14页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2018MG007);山东省社会科学基金面上项目(18CGLJ01)

摘　　要：通过实践中不断涌现的控制权争夺局面可以洞悉,高管声誉在上市公司权力博弈的过程中扮演了重要角色。本文以2011-2015年中国上市公司平衡面板数据作为样本,实证检验了双重代理关系框架下高管声誉对上市公司权力配置的影响,从崭新视角阐释了高管声誉对上市公司治理的作用路径。研究表明,根据来源不同高管权力可以分为基于高管身份的绝对权力与基于股权特征的相对权力,高管声誉对其拥有的绝对权力具有显著的正向影响;基于身份的绝对权力在高管声誉与高管薪酬水平之间存在中介效应,即高管声誉导致绝对权力的增加,继而提高了高管薪酬水平;高管声誉能够明显抑制控股股东的侵占效应,有效解决第二类代理问题;在国有上市公司中高管声誉的治理作用更为显著。本文的结论拓展了现有公司治理研究的视域,并为上市公司运用高管声誉等隐性契约进行合理的权力配置从而提升治理水平提供有益参考。The continuous control over the competition shows that executive reputation plays an important role in the process of the power game of the listed companies. Based on the balanced panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2011 to 2015, this paper empirically examines the influence of executive reputation on the power allocation of listed companies under the framework of dual agency relationship, and illustrates the path of executive reputation on the governance of listed companies from a new perspective. The research shows that, according to the different source of power, executive power can be divided into the absolute power based on the executive identity and the relative power based on the ownership characteristics. The executive reputation has a significant positive impact on absolute power and the absolute power of the executive has the mediating effect between the executive reputation and the executive compensation level. That is, the executive repu tation leads to the increase of absolute power, and then increases the executive compensation level. The managerial reputation can obviously restrain the expropriation effect of controlling shareholders, and effectively solve the second kind of agency problem. In state-owned listed companies, the governance of executive reputation is more significant. The conclusions of this paper extend the horizon of existing corporate governance research, and provide a useful reference for the listed companies to use the implicit contracts such as executive reputation to improve the governance level.

关 键 词：高管声誉 权力配置 高管薪酬 控股股东侵占效应 双重代理关系 

分 类 号：F830.2[经济管理—金融学]