多点接触、市场进入与企业绩效间关系的实证研究  

An empirical study on the relationship among multimarket contact,market entry and firm performance

作　　者：张婷[1] 邓新明[1,2] 黄瑜 ZHANG Ting1,DENG Xinming1,2,HUANG Yu3(1. Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China; 2. Institute of Strategic Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China; 3. China Index Academy, Beijing 100070, Chin)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]武汉大学战略管理研究所,武汉430072 [3]中国指数研究院,北京100070

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2018年第5期1118-1131,共14页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71572132,71272232);中央高校基本科研业务经费(201660);武汉大学人文社会科学青年学者学术发展团队建设项目(Whu2016011)~~

摘　　要：本文试图以探讨多点接触、市场进入和企业绩效三者间的关系作为切入点,达到为企业在动态的竞争环境下如何采取理性有效的竞争战略提出相关建议的目的.通过利用回归分析以及稳健性检验对所提出的假设进行了验证,其结果表明：多点接触与市场进入行为间呈倒U型关系;市场进入行为对多点接触与企业绩效两者间的关系有着遮掩效应.具体表现为多点接触对企业绩效产生的正向直接效应大于其通过市场进入对企业绩效产生的负向间接效应;CEO政治背景对多点接触与市场进入行为间的关系有负向调节作用.因此基于以上分析结果,本文认为企业主动增加与竞争对手间存在的多点接触程度可以视为一种重要的非市场战略.This paper attempts to discuss the relationship between multimarket contact, market entry and firm performance as a starting point to provide suggestions for firms how to adopt rational and effective competitive strategy in the dynamic competitive environment. The proposed hypotheses were verified by regression analysis and robustness test. The results show that： firstly, multimarket contact has an inverted U-shape influence on market entry; secondly, market entry has a shadowing effect on the relationship between multimarket contact and firm performance. That is, the positive direct effect of multimarket contact on firm performance is greater than the negative indirect effect multimarket contact on firm performance through market entry; and then the political background of CEO has a negative moderating influence on the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry. Therefore, based on the above analysis results, this paper argues that the firm takes the initiative to increase the degree of multimarket contact with competitors can be regarded as an important non-market strategy.

关 键 词：多点接触 市场进入 企业绩效 CEO政治背景 非市场战略 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F279.2