代理冲突、企业战略选择与股价崩盘风险  

Agency Conflict,Corporate Strategic Choice and Stock Price Crash Risk

作　　者：王禹[1] 胡国柳[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2018年第6期46-52,共7页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71562010)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文以2009-2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察了企业战略差异对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究结果表明:企业战略差异度越大,未来股价崩盘风险越高;股东与管理层之间的代理冲突是导致二者正相关关系的主要原因;在法律制度环境较差地区,经理人更容易通过企业战略差异窖藏"坏消息",从而加剧股价崩盘风险。进一步研究发现,会计稳健性能够降低企业战略差异度对股价崩盘风险的正向影响作用。本文丰富了股价崩盘风险的相关研究,对于如何监管企业战略以降低股价崩盘风险、维护金融市场稳定也具有重要的参考价值。Based on a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed companies in 2009-2014 years, this paper examines the impact of corporate strategic differences on stock price crash risk. The results show that the greater the corporate strategic difference,the higher the risk of the stock price collapse in the future; the agency conflict between the shareholders and the management is the main cause of the positive correlation between the two, and the manager is more likely to cellar the "bad news" through the strategic difference in the legal system environment, thus aggravating the stock price collapse. Risk. Further studies show that accounting conservatism can reduce the positive impact of corporate strategic differentiation on stock price collapse risk. This paper enriches the related research on the risk of stock price collapse, and has important reference value for how to supervise the enterprise strategy to reduce the risk of the stock price collapse and maintain the stability of the financial market.

关 键 词：股价崩盘风险 战略差异度 监督效应 会计稳健性 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51