分配正义中运用应得概念的困境与出路  

On Dilemma and Way of Using the Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice

作　　者：宗民[1] ZONG Min(School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《内蒙古大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2018年第3期41-46,共6页Journal of Inner Mongolia University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：西方政治思想史和哲学史上在探讨"正义"问题时有着以"应得(desert)"作为核心依据的悠久传统。当代政治哲学发展的过程中,一些政治哲学家——尤其以罗尔斯为代表——拒绝了这种传统。他们批判了应得在分配正义中的作用和地位,并因之提出了极为有力的理论和论证。应得概念,从直觉上而言是很难从分配正义的理论建设中被彻底清除的。如果要继续在分配正义领域运用这一概念,就需要在明晰诸多针对它的批判理论的基础上,在严肃的理论论证层面为应得概念寻找出路。There has been a long tradition of discussing problems of ＂ justice＂ based primarily on ＂ Deserve＂ in the history of Western political thought and philosophy. With the development of modern political philosophy,some political philosophers,with Rawls as representative,refused the tradition. They criticized the function and position of ＂ Deserve＂ in distributive justice and thereby put forward their own powerful theories and argumentation. Intuitively it is very difficult to completely get rid of the concept of ＂ Deserve＂ from the theory of distributive justice. And if ＂ Deserve＂ continue to be implemented within distributive justice,researchers must search for a new way on serious theoretical level after clarifying many critical theories about ＂ Deserve＂.

关 键 词：分配正义 应得概念 努力 

分 类 号：B82-02[哲学宗教—伦理学]