短视和策略乘客并存的航空机票定价研究  

Optimal Pricing for Tickets with Myopic and Strategic Passengers

作　　者：谭美容[1] TAN Mei-rong(School of Economics, Rongzhi College of Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 410320, China)

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学融智学院经济学院

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2018年第3期107-115,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402012)

摘　　要：针对竞争环境下短视和策略乘客并存时航空公司的定价问题，提出了价格展示和动态定价两种定价策略。通过建立价格展示和动态定价模型，分别求出了两航空公司的价格均衡及期望收益，并证明了在两种定价策略下竞争双方都存在纯策略价格均衡。最后比较了两种策略下航空公司的收益差异，发现：当短视乘客数量较多时，宜采用价格展示策略；而当供小于求时，动态定价策略更优。Price display pricing and dynamic pricing strategies were proposed for airlines to a mix of myopic and strategic passengers under competition. By building price display pricing and dynamic pricing model, the price equilibrium and the expected revenues of two airlines were obtained. And it was proven that there always existed a pure strategy Nash equilibrium to airlines under two strategies. Then, some results are obtained by comparing two strategies： The more myopic passengers, the better price display pricing - When supply is short, dynamic pricing is more profitable than price display pricing.

关 键 词：动态定价 价格展示 短视乘客 策略乘客 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]