会计业绩、公司治理机制与高管薪酬契约  

Accounting Performance,Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Compensation Covenant

作　　者：马笑芳[1] 况学文[2] MA Xiao - fang;KUANG Xue - wen(School of Accounting and Finance, Zhejiang Gongszhang University, Hangzhou 310018, China;School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031, China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]南昌大学经济管理学院,江西南昌330031

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2018年第2期64-70,共7页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目"多层次金融市场发展;金融审计与金融风险治理:一项整合机制研究"(12YJC790138)

摘　　要：会计信息的契约角色及其实现机制是新兴市场和转型经济体会计有用性研究的重要命题。在实证考察我国经济转型关键期内外部公司治理机制对会计业绩与高管薪酬关联性影响的基础上,研究结果表明,会计业绩信息在我国上市公司的高管薪酬契约中得到了广泛运用,但在不同内外部公司治理机制下,会计业绩与高管薪酬的关联性存在明显差异。研究发现,产权性质为非国有、制衡型股权结构以及所属行业竞争更为充分的公司,其会计业绩与高管薪酬的关联性更强。不过,研究并未发现外部审计以及董事会中设立薪酬委员会与否会对上述关联性产生显著影响。This paper investigates the relationship between accounting information which reflects corporate profitability and corporate executives＇ compensation in different governance institutions. We found there are significant differences of the relationship between accounting performance and executive＇s compensation information in the context of different governance institutions. Specifically,the relationship is stronger in non-stated listed corporate,more competitive industries and lower share ratio of the first shareholder. However,we did not find that the external audit and the establishment of a remuneration committee on the board of directors will have a significant impact on the above-mentined relevance.

关 键 词：公司治理机制 会计业绩 高管薪酬 

分 类 号：F231.6[经济管理—会计学]