建设工程分包合同激励模型设计与分析  

The Design and Analysis of an Incentive Model for Construction Subcontract

作　　者：刘迅[1] LIU Xun(School of Civil Engineering,Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215000,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州科技大学土木工程学院,江苏苏州215000

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2018年第3期103-107,共5页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(JUSRP1031);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2017SJB1364);苏州科技大学高层次人才基金项目(331711105)

摘　　要：在总承包项目中总包商与其长期合作的分包商之间的协作关系值得关注,引入对各分包商相互协作的激励,利用委托代理理论,建立多分包商时团队协作激励的分包合同激励模型。模型分析表明,当分包商的工作相互独立、在时间和空间上不互相影响时,总包商可同时提供个体激励和团队激励;而当分包商之间的工作联系比较密切,在时间和空间上互相影响时,总包商可只提供团队激励来诱使分包商之间相互协作、互相帮助。In the general contracting mode, the collaboration between general contractor and subcontractors based on the division of labor can greatly increase the outcomes of the project. A multi-subcontractor team motivation model is established based on the theory of principal-agent. The results show that when the work of each subcontractor is independent without any interaction on time and space, the general contractor can provide individual incentives and team incentives; and when subcontractors work are closely connected in terms of time and space, general contractor may only provide team incentives to motivate collaboration and mutual assistance among subcontractors.

关 键 词：建设工程 总承包商 分包商 激励机制 

分 类 号：TU723.1[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]