金融机构高管薪酬存在风险敏感性吗?——基于中国上市金融机构的经验证据  

Does Financial Institution Executive Compensation Exist Risk Sensitivity——Based on the Empirical Evidence of China's A-share Listed Financial Institutions

作　　者：宋清华[1] 胡世超 毛庆 SONG Qinghua;HU Shichao;MAO Qing(School of Finance,zhongnan University of Economics and Lazy,Wuhan,Hubei 430073,China;School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学金融学院,湖北武汉430073 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2018年第4期8-17,共10页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(13AJY017)

摘　　要：基于中国上市金融机构2008-2016年的非平衡面板数据,研究金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性问题。结果表明:金融机构的风险承担与高管薪酬呈显著的正相关关系,意味着金融机构高管薪酬契约存在风险敏感性;相较于非国有金融机构,国有金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性较低;以监事会人数、监事会会议次数、独立董事占比与第一大股东持股比例作为代理变量,管理层权力在一定程度上影响风险承担与高管薪酬之间的关系。Based on unbalanced data of China＇s Listed financial institutions from the year 2008 to 2016,this paper empirically analyzes risk sensitivity of executive compensation in financial institutions.The result reveals a significant positive relation between risk-taking and executive compensation,which also means that executive compensations of financial institutions exist risk sensitivity.At the same time,with respect to non-state financial institutions,risk sensitivity of executive compensations appears weaker in state financial institutions.What＇s more,management power,as represented by size of the board of supervisors,the number of meetings of the board of supervisors,the proportion of independent directors,and the proportion of share held by the first largest shareholders,can influence the relation between risk-taking and executive compensation.

关 键 词：金融机构 高管薪酬 风险承担 管理层权力 

分 类 号：F830.22[经济管理—金融学]