超竞争环境下企业困境并购定价与时机选择的期权博弈分析  

Option Game Analyses on the Pricing and Timing of Firm in Financial Distress M&A Under Hyper-Competition

作　　者：关健[1] 闫研 GUAN Jian, YAN Yan(Business School, Central South University, Changsha 410083, Chin)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2018年第7期58-67,共10页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71431006);国家自然科学基金项目(71271080);教育部人文社会科学基金(13YJA630020);中南大学创新驱动项目(2015CX010)

摘　　要：基于期权博弈理论,以超竞争环境为研究背景,在多个主并企业合作的情形下,建立目标企业存在财务困境的并购模型,得出主并方的最优并购时机;并进行数值模拟分析,重点分析了代表超竞争特点的三个变量(竞争强度、竞争不确定性、企业价值损失因子)、主并企业联盟中参与者的重要程度及联盟中发生机会主义的概率、企业困境因子这六个变量对并购阈值的影响。Based on the option game theory and the fact of acquiring firms cooperating with each other, the study establishes models for the choice of the pricing and timing of target firm in financial distress M＆A under the hyper-competition environment. After getting the optimal M＆A timing, the paper progresses numerical simulation analysis and emphasizes analyzing the influence of hyper-competition variables （ competitive intensity, competitive uncertainty, loss factor of enterprise value） , the importance of the participants in acquiring firms alliance, the occurrence probability of cooperation opportunism in alliance and firm distressed factor on M＆A timing.

关 键 词：管理科学 超竞争 期权博弈 企业困境并购 并购时机 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]