并购业绩承诺方式的激励效应研究  

Research on the Incentive Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions Performance Commitment Ways

作　　者：饶艳超[1] 段良晓 朱秀丽[3] Rao Yanchao;Duan Liangxiao;Zhu Xiuli(School of Accountancy,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;Department of Investment Banking,China Securities,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Accountancy,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433 [2]中信建投证券公司投行部,上海200433 [3]南京财经大学会计学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2018年第7期73-83,98,共12页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272011);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502077);2017财政部管理会计专项课题(CZBGLKJ201714);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(青年)(14YJC630221);上海高校本科重点教学改革项目;江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目

摘　　要：本文采用2010—2014年间A股中小板和创业板并购境内标的并签订业绩补偿协议的标的公司样本,研究业绩补偿承诺对标的公司的激励效应。研究表明,双向业绩承诺比单向业绩承诺的激励效果更为显著;当业绩承诺未达到预期标准时,股份补偿方式比现金补偿方式的激励效果更为显著;相比于没有减值测试补偿条款,约定减值测试补偿具有更好的激励效应;并购业绩承诺对管理层薪酬激励效果不明确。本文的研究不仅可以为并购交易的业绩承诺条款签订提供借鉴意义,也为监管部门对并购交易过程中高估值、高风险的业绩承诺风险监管提供证据支持。Affected by various factors, target compaflies may embrace the risk of not meeting the performance committed, which leads to multiple forms of performance commitment and performance commitment compensation. Limited by the sample size, different incentive effects of compensation forms are only proved in case studies （Tang and Liu, 2006; Gao, 2010）, and the results are not promoted to large sample studies （Lu, et al., 2014; Yang, 2016）. Using data of mergers and acquisitions on Chinese A-share SME Board and GEM during 2010-2014, this paper investigates the incentive effect of performance commitment forms, including the effects of the one-way value adjustment mechanism and the two-way value adjustment mechanism, stock compensation and cash compensation, asset impairment test compensation clause on executive compensation and firm performance. We find the evidence that performance commitment helps target companies to meet committed performance： the two-way value adjustment mechanism is more effective than that of one-way; the stock compensation is more effective than the cash compensation; the agreed impairment test compensation clause is more effective than the non-impairment test compensation clause. The incentive effect of performance commitment on executive compensation is mixed： the two- way value adjustment mechanism is more effective than that of one-way; there is no significant difference not only between the roles of stock compensation and cash compensation, but also between the agreed impairment test compensation clause and the non-impairment test compensation clause. The contributions of this paper include： First, we analyze the incentive effect of various commitment forms on managers comprehensively. Previous research focuses on the incentive effects of the one-way value adjustment mechanism and the two-way value adjustment mechanism, stock compensation and cash compensation （Lu, et al., 2014; Yang, 2016）, but ignores the effect of asset impairment due to merger premium. This paper cond

关 键 词：并购 业绩承诺 激励效应 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]