官员晋升激励与政策执行绩效的实证研究  

An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Promotion Incentives of Government Officials and Performance of Policy Implementation

作　　者：吴少微[1] 魏姝[1] WU Shao-wei;WEI Shu(School of Governance,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学政府管理学院,南京210023

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2018年第4期101-110,共10页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金面上项目"中国情境下的政策执行问题研究"(2017M620208);2016年度国家社科基金重点项目"促进参与和公正分配的公共政策体系研究"(16AZD027)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：中国特殊制度背景对政策执行的影响是学界长期关注的问题,但目前尚未得到统一结论。这是因为,一是学界缺乏能够测量中国特殊制度背景的量表工具,二是当前的实证研究大多采用案例方法,很难同时分析多种关键变量对政策执行绩效的共同影响。通过对官员晋升激励、目标管理责任制等概念的操作化和测量,并将"政策特性视角"和"激励机制视角"相结合,考察了在政策模糊性和冲突性同时存在的情况下,官员晋升激励等中国特殊制度背景对政策执行绩效的共同影响。Exploring the influence of China＇s special political systems on its policy implementation has become a popu- lar research topic for many years; however, researchers have not achieved a unanimous conclusion. One reason may be the lack of survey tools for measuring Chinese political systems, and another reason may be the limitations of research methods ： extensive empirical studies are most case studies, which do not provide accurate analyses of the interactive influence of mul- tiple Chinese political systems. Through the operation and measurement of the concepts of Target Responsibility System and Civil Service Promotion Incentive ; and the combination of the perspective of policy features and the perspective of incentive mechanisms, this research explores the influence of Chinese special political systems on the performance of policy implementation.

关 键 词：政策执行 目标责任制 官员晋升激励 

分 类 号：D60[政治法律—政治学]