政治关联、政府补贴与企业创新绩效  

Political Connection,Fiscal Subsidy and Its Innovation Performance

作　　者：杨筠 宁向东[1] Yang Jun,Ning Xiangdong(School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,Chin)

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《技术经济》2018年第5期31-37,共7页Journal of Technology Economics

摘　　要：选取中国中小企业板的民营上市公司为样本,利用回归分析方法实证研究了企业政治关联与企业获得政府补贴的关系,以及企业政治关联对政府补贴创新绩效的影响。结果显示:政治关联对企业获取政府补贴有正向影响;政治关联削弱了政府补贴对企业创新绩效的积极作用。指出:政治关联为民营企业提供了寻租渠道,基于政治关联发放政府补贴会扭曲资源配置、降低资源使用效率。Using the data of private companies listed in SME board in China,this paper tests empirically the relationship between political connection and fiscal subsidy and the impact of political connection on the performance of subsidy to innovaiton.It finds that political connection has apositive influence on fiscal subsidy,and has negative effects on the innovation performance of subsidy.Finally,it points out that developing political connection is a way for private enterprises to seek rent,which may distort scarce resources allocation and reduce the efficiency of government resource use.

关 键 词：政治关联 政府补贴 创新绩效 寻租 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]