跨国公司逆向知识转移母子公司内部激励机制研究  

Study on the Internal Incentive Mechanism concerning Reverse Knowledge Transfer from Subsidiaries to Parent Companies in MNEs

作　　者：李新剑[1,2] 吴红迪[2] 吕凯[2] 范丽娜[2] LI Xin-jian;WU Hong-di;LV Kai;FAN Li-na(l.College of Economics and Trade,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou 310023;Department of Trade and Economics,Anhui Technical College of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering,Wuhu 241000,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310023 [2]安徽机电职业技术学院经贸管理系,安徽芜湖241000

出　　处：《安徽商贸职业技术学院学报》2018年第2期10-14,共5页Journal of Anhui Business College

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630069);安徽省高校人文社科重点项目(SK2017A0804)

摘　　要：子公司的逆向知识转移已经成为许多新兴经济体母公司获取知识资源的重要手段。然而在实践中,普遍存在子公司知识转移意愿不强、投机主义盛行等问题。通过构建不完全信息下的分离均衡和混同均衡博弈模型,剖析了母子公司在逆向知识转移中的博弈行为及作用机制。以此为基础,构建不完全信息激励机制模型,通过向子公司提供信息租金以建立次级激励可行契约,从而优化母子公司在知识逆向转移中的激励行为。激励不足是母子公司知识转移动力不足的重要原因,此研究成果对于改善和优化母子公司的激励决策具有借鉴作用。bReverse knowledge transfer from subsidiaries has become an important means for parent companies of many emerging economies to acquire knowledge resources. However, in practice, there are some problems such as the weak willingness of knowledge transfer from subsidiary companies and the prevalence of opportunism. By constructing the game models of separation equilibrium and mixed equilibrium under incomplete information, this paper analyzes the game behavior as well as mechanism of parent and subsidiary companies in reverse knowledge transfer. On this basis, the incentive mechanism model of incomplete information is constructed, and the incentive behavior of parent company in knowledge reverse transfer is optimized by providing the information rent to the subsidiary company to establish the feasible contract of secondary incentive. Lack of incentive is an important cause for the unwillingness in the transfer of knowledge. The research results can be used for a reference to improve and optimize the incentive decision of parent-subsidiary companies.

关 键 词：逆向知识转移 分离均衡 混同均衡 激励契约 信息租金 

分 类 号：F276.7[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]