混合所有制改革实践与企业绩效——基于非国有股东派任董监高的中介效应  

The Practice of Mixed Ownership Reform and Corporate Performance——Based on the Mediating Effect of Non-state-owned Shareholders Appointed as Directors,Supervisors and Executives

作　　者：谢海洋[1] 曹少鹏[1] 孟欣 XIE Hai-yang;CAO Shao-peng;MENG Xin(Finance and Accounting Research Center,Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics,Zhengzhou 450046,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州航空工业管理学院财务与会计研究中心,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2018年第9期123-131,共9页East China Economic Management

基　　金：河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2016BJJ055);郑州航空工业管理学院研究生教育创新计划基金项目(2017CX001);航空经济发展河南省协同创新中心资助项目

摘　　要：文章以2010-2016年沪深A股国有企业非金融类上市公司为研究对象,探究非国有股东对国有企业绩效的作用路径,研究发现:非国有股东持股比例与派任董监高、国有企业绩效显著正相关;非国有股东派任董监高在非国有股东持股比例作用于企业绩效的路径中起着部分中介作用,并且这种中介效应在垄断性国有企业行业中更显著。文章不仅丰富了股东治理与企业绩效的相关文献,更直接为国有企业混合所有制改革过程中非国有股东的作用路径提供了经验证据,对进一步推进国有企业改革具有一定的参考价值。This paper,taking A-share non-financial listed companies of state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2016 as the study object,explores the role of non-state-owned shareholders in the performance of stateowned enterprises. The study finds that： the proportion of non-state-owned shareholding is positively correlated with the number of directors,supervisors and executives appointed by non-state-owned shareholders; The ratio of directors,supervisors and executives appointed by non-state-owned shareholders in the proportion of of non-state-owned shareholding plays a partial mediating role in corporate performance. Moreover,this mediating role is more significant in the monopolized state-owned enterprises. This paper not only enriches the relevant literature of shareholder governance and corporate performance,but also provides empirical evidence for the mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders in the process of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,which has certain reference value to further promote the reform of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 非国有股东持股比例 派任董监高 企业绩效 中介效应 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272[经济管理—国民经济]