退市制度变革对上市公司盈余管理行为影响  

The Influence of Delisting System Reform on Earnings Management Behavior of Listed Companies

作　　者：许文静[1] 苏立 吕鹏[1] 郝洪[1] Xu Wenjing

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(北京)工商管理学院,102249 [2]首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院,100070

出　　处：《会计研究》2018年第6期32-38,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：中国石油大学(北京)科研基金(2462015YQ0702)资助

摘　　要：本文选取2010～2014年沪深主板A股上市公司为研究样本,采用倾向得分匹配法和双重差分法,检验了2012年我国退市制度变革对公司应计和真实盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现:退市制度变革没有显著影响公司应计盈余管理行为,但显著抑制了其真实盈余管理行为,主要是降低了公司生产操控和费用操控行为;从退市细化指标看,净利润仍是上市公司触及的主要退市指标,是影响公司盈余管理行为的主要因素,新增退市指标尚未发挥显著影响作用。研究结果表明,退市新规对真实盈余管理治理效应显著,但对应计盈余管理的制度制约和诱导作用同时存在,导致治理效应不显著,应进一步消除制度诱导因素,压缩*ST公司规避退市中的非经常性应计项目弹性空间。This paper examines the impact of delisting system reform in 2012 on accruals and real earnings management behavior, adopting propen- sity score matching and differences-in-differences methods. The paper finds that： delisting system reform has not significantly impacted on companies＇ accrued earnings management behavior; but significantly restrained real earnings management behavior. Net profit is still the main delisting indicators to be touched and main factor that influences the earnings management behavior. The new delisting indicators have not played a significant role. The results show that the new delisting regulation has a significant governance effect on real earnings management; However, for the accruals earnings management, system constraints and induction factors existing simultaneously. Delisting system should further compress ＊ ST companies non-recurring accruals elastic space

关 键 词：退市制度变革 盈余管理 倾向得分匹配法 双重差分法 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]