制造商与经销商合作广告逆向选择与投资效率  

Adverse Selection and Investment Efficiency in Cooperative Advertising between Manufacturer and Distributor

作　　者：田永杰 王文举[1,3] TIAN Yong-jie1,2, WANG Wen-ju1,3(1.School of Economics, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070; 2. Sias International School, Zhengzhou University, Xinzheng Henan 451150, China; 3. School of Economics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, Chin)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学经济学院,北京100070 [2]郑州大学西亚斯国际学院,河南新郑451150 [3]北京物资学院经济学院,北京101149

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2018年第8期3-7,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA072);北京市属高等学校高层次人才引进与培养"长城学者"计划资助项目(CIT&TCD20140321);河南省2017年民办高校品牌专业建设项目(教政法[2017]344号)

摘　　要：广告能力是经销商的私人信息,经销商在与制造商的合作广告中通过隐藏自己能力的真实信息产生逆向选择,使供应链资源配置扭曲。文章运用委托代理理论,构建风险中性的制造商和经销商二层供应链合作广告模型,将经销商广告能力作为隐藏信息变量,研究信息不对称下的广告合作投资效率问题。研究表明:由于存在经销商逆向选择,进而有经销商、制造商合作广告投资低效率;制造商对低能力经销商广告补贴多,对高能力经销商广告补贴少,制造商广告资源配置低效率;信息不对称使制造商收益下降等问题。The distributor advertising ability in the cooperative advertising is private information. Distributors hide their true information and produce adverse selection, distorting supply chain resource allocation in the cooperative advertising with the manufacturer. The principal-agent theory is used in the paper to construct a risk-neutral model of cooperative advertising between twotier supply chain of manufacturer and distributor. Distributor advertising ability is used as a hidden information variable to study the efficiency of advertising cooperation and investment under asymmetric information. The research shows that distributor and manufacturer have low efficiency in cooperation and advertising investment in the case of reverse selection of distributor. Manufacturers have more subsidies for low-capacity distributor; fewer subsidies for high-capacity distributor, and manufacturers have low allocation of advertising resources. Information asymmetry causes manufacturers to lose revenue.

关 键 词：合作广告 逆向选择 投资效率 资源配置 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]