行权时间限制能增强股权激励效应吗?  

Can Vesting Time Restrictions Strengthen Equity Incentive Effects?

作　　者：刘宝华[1] 罗宏[2] BAOHUA LIU;HONG Luo

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院 [2]西南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2017年第4期483-504,共22页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目批准号:71702153)的阶段性成果;教育部人文社科规划项目(项目批准号:14XJA630002);全国会计科研课题重点项目(项目批准号:2015KJA026)的资助

摘　　要：中国股权激励管理制度要求上市公司实施股权激励必须设定锁定期和分期解锁安排,构成了行权时间限制特征。本文基于2006—2014年中国非金融行业A股上市公司股权激励详细的手工数据,考察行权时间限制对股权激励效应的影响。本文以行权时间限制为准绳,将高管权益区分为长期权益和短期权益,研究发现：（1）长期权益和短期权益能提升公司价值与经营业绩;（2）短期权益的激励作用依赖于公司治理机制,而长期权益的激励作用则独立于大多数的公司治理机制。进一步的分析表明,行权时间限制增强股权激励效应是通过激励风险承担和提升资本投资效率等路径来实现的。研究表明,行权时间限制是提高股权激励效应的有效途径。Chinese regulations on equity incentives require that the listed companies should set vesting restriction and installment unlock arrangement,these are the characteristics of vesting time restriction. This paper investigates the effect vesting time restriction on equity incentives based on the hand-collected data of non-financial industry A-share listed firms,from 2006—2014. Also,this study takes vesting time restriction as a criterion to classify executives＇ equity into long-term equity and short-term equity, and finds that, firstly,both kinds of equites could increase firm value as well as performance. Furthermore,the effect of short-term equity dependents on other corporate governance mechanism, while the effects of long-term equity are more independent. Additional tests show that, the channels of the effect that vesting time restriction on equity incentives are including encouraging risk-taking and enhancing capital investment efficiency. Collectively,the study offers evidence that vesting time restriction is an efficient path to enhance equity incentives effect.

关 键 词：股权激励 行权时间限制 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]