搭便车低碳供应链纵向合作的微分博弈模型  

Differential game model of longitudinal cooperation in hitchhiking low carbon supply chain

作　　者：吴美香[1] 史成东 WU Mei xiang;SHI Cheng dong(School of Management,Shandong University of Technology,Zibo 255012,China)

机构地区：[1]山东理工大学管理学院,山东淄博255012

出　　处：《山东理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2018年第6期52-57,共6页Journal of Shandong University of Technology:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(16YJAZH053);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2013GM001)

摘　　要：双销售渠道间的搭便车已是常态.为了研究双渠道低碳供应链成员间的搭便车行为,以减排量为状态变量,假定市场需求受减排量和促销努力双重影响,构建单制造商和单零售商的3种微分博弈模型,探讨低碳供应链上下游企业合作条件及各参数对成员决策影响.研究发现:一定条件下,成本分担契约可实现各成员及系统利润改善;当制造商单位收益达到一定条件,成本分担契约对制造商利润改善效果更佳;过高的零售商低碳宣传成本和搭便车消费者比率会降低成本分担契约的改善效果.Hitchhiking among dual sales channels is the norm.To study the hitchhiking behavior between members of the double channel low carbon supply chain,by treating the emission reductions as state variables,this paper assumes that the market demand is affected by emission reduction and promotion efforts,and builds three kinds of differential game model for single manufacturer and single retailer to discuss the cooperation conditions of upstream and downstream enterprises of low carbon supply chain and the effects of various parameters on member′s decision.The results show that under certain conditions,cost sharing contracts can improve the profits of all members and systems.When the unit profit of manufacturer reaches certain condition,the profit improvement effect of the manufacturer is better than that of the retailer.Excessive retailers′low carbon promotion costs or high consumers′free-riding ratios could reduce the cost sharing contract′s improvement.

关 键 词：微分博弈 消费者搭便车 低碳供应链 生态研发 低碳推广 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]