董事网络能够治理管理者过度自信吗?——基于企业非效率投资的视角  

Can Director Network Effectively Govern the Overconfidence of Managers?——Based on the Perspective of Inefficient Investment

作　　者：郝云宏[1] 马帅[1] HAO Yun-hong;MA Shuai(School of Management,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学工商管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2018年第9期36-47,共12页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272143);浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y16G020007)

摘　　要：基于社会网络理论,本文从企业非效率投资的视角研究了董事网络对管理者过度自信的治理效果和作用路径。研究结果表明:随着董事网络中心度的提高,管理者过度自信与非效率投资的关系减弱,这意味着董事网络能够治理管理者过度自信带来的非效率投资;相比于国有企业,非国有企业中董事网络治理效果更为显著。从董事会层面和连锁董事个体层面进一步分析发现,董事会会议次数越多,董事网络治理作用越强;连锁董事越勤勉,出席董事会会议次数越多,董事网络的治理效果越好。本研究剖析了董事网络治理的机理,揭开了董事网络治理的黑箱,同时找到了能够有效削弱管理者过度自信的治理机制,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。Based on the theory of social network, this paper studies the governance effect and action path of director network on the overconfidence to managers from the perspective of enterprise non-efficiency investment. The results show that with the increase of the degree of network central-ity, the relationship between managerial overconfidence and non-efficiency investment is weakened, which means that the director network has the governance effect on the relationship; in private en-terprises, the governance effect of the director network is more significant. Further research shows that the more the board meetings held, the better the governance effect of the director network; the more diligent the chain director, the better the governance effect of the director network. This study analyzes the mechanism of director network governance, reveals the black box of director net-work governance, and at the same time found the effective governance mechanism to weaken man-agers overconfidence, which has important theoretical significance and practical significance.

关 键 词：董事网络 过度自信 连锁董事 非效率投资 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]