公平偏好信息非对称下的信号传递博弈模型  

Signaling Game Model under Asymmetry Fairness-concern Information

作　　者：覃燕红[1] 魏光兴 潘亚运 QIN Yan-hong;WEI Guang-xing;PAN Ya-yun(chool of Management,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054 [2]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2018年第18期21-31,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年(16CGL017);国家博士后基金(2017M623011)

摘　　要：采用信号传递模型来研究公平偏好信息非对称下零售商的甄选与合作问题．首先，对零售商公平偏好信息对称和非对称下供应商收益进行比较，得出零售商公平偏好信息非对称会引起逆向选择问题并损坏供应商收益．然后，分别设计了不同类型零售商信号传递成本相同、不同情况下的信号传递博弈模型来揭示零售商的真实公平偏好类型．最后，通过模型推理发现只有当不同类型零售商的信号传递成本不同时，信号传递模型才能起到揭示零售商类型的作用，从而解决公平偏好信息非对称引起的逆向选择问题．We study the reverse retailer selection and cooperation from the perspective of signaling fairness-concern information. Firstly, we compare the profit in symmetry case and asymmetry case of retailer＇ s fairness concern, and compute out that the supplier＇ s profit in asymmetry case is lower than that in symmetry case obviously, leading to the adverse selection problem. Then, we establish the signaling game model with same and different signaling cost so as to effectively reveal the types of fairness concern. Finally, we prove that only when the signaling cost of retailers with different fairness concern is different, the signal transmission model can just reveal the retailer type, and thus the supplier can choose the right retailer to cooperate even in the asymmetric information case, solving the adverse selection problem caused by fairness concern.

关 键 词：公平偏好 信息非对称 批发价格契约 信号传递博弈 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]