机构投资者与终极控制人的竞合对债务期限的影响  

An Analysis on the Influence of the Cooperation-Competition Relationship between Institutional Investors and Ultimate Controllers on Debt Maturity

作　　者：刘新民[1] 孙田田[1] 王垒[1] LIU Xin-min;SUN Tian-tian;WANG Lei(School of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2018年第9期110-124,共15页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371111);教育部人文社会科学规划青年基金(17YJC630154);山东省自然科学基金博士基金项目(ZR2016GB07);山东科技大学科研创新团队项目(2015TDJH103);山东科技大学人才引进科研启动基金资助项目(2017RCJJ1019)

摘　　要：以我国2010—2016年A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了不同期望收益水平下机构投资者大股东相对于终极控制人的竞争力对债务期限决策的治理效果。研究结果表明：当期望收益水平为正时,机构投资者大股东的竞争力与债务期限负相关;当期望收益水平为负时,机构投资者大股东的竞争力对债务期限无显著影响。进一步的研究显示：当终极控制人具有政府身份时,机构投资者的竞争力对债务期限无显著影响;当终极控制人具有机构投资者身份时,机构投资者的竞争力与债务期限正相关。Taking China＇s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as the research objects, this paper empirically tests the governance effect of the competitiveness of institutional investors as major shareholders relative to ultimate controllers on debt maturity decision under different expected returns level. We conclude as follows. When the expected return level is positive, the competitiveness of institutional investor as major shareholders is negatively related to debt maturity. When the expected return level is negative,the competitiveness of institutional investor as major shareholders exerts no significant influence on debt maturity. It is further found that, when the ultimate controller owns the government identity, the competitiveness of institutional investor exerts no significant influence on debt maturity. While the ultimate controller acts as the institutional investor, his competitiveness is positively related to debt maturity.

关 键 词：终极控制人 机构投资者 期望收益 债务期限 控制权竞争 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]